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[The federal Government is proposing to bring about a single national 
scheme for the regulation of industrial relations in Australia. This will 
raise a number of important constitutional questions that may need to be 
resolved by the High Court. These questions as examined in this article 
are: could a single national law for the regulation of industrial relations 
be passed under a head of Commonwealth power (in particular, under the 
Commonwealth's powers over corporations, interstate trade and 
commerce or external affairs); even such a law could so be enacted, would 
it nevertheless be struck down due to an express or implied constitutional 
limitation; and to what extent could the law override the State laws that 
already govern much of the field?] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The idea of a single national scheme for the regulation of industrial relations in 
Australia has had longstanding support from the Howard Government.1 The main 
impediment has been political. The Government has not controlled the Senate, the 
* Anthony Mason Professor and Director, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of New South Wales; Barrister, New South Wales Bar. Thanks to Anna Saulwick for her 
research assistance. This article has been developed from a paper delivered at Industrial Relations 
Reform: Fair Go or Anything Goes?, on 13 July 2005. 
 
1 PETER REITH, GETTING THE OUTSIDERS INSIDE—TOWARDS A RATIONAL WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA (1999); DEPARTMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND SMALL 
BUSINESS, BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK: TOWARDS A SIMPLER NATIONAL WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
SYSTEM (2000), 3 VOLS. The idea has also generated significant support in the business community and was 
the subject of a forum run by the Business Council of Australia. See BUSINESS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, 
MELBOURNE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FORUM: PROCEEDINGS (2001). 
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upper House in Australia’s national Parliament, and has thus lacked the numbers to 
enact the change. This was demonstrated by the Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Termination of Employment) Bill 2002, a pilot proposal for a national law. That 
Bill, rejected in the Senate, would have amended the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) as it related to harsh, unjust or unreasonable dismissal.2 In doing so, it sought 
also to expand the coverage of the law in this area from 3.9 to 6.8 million employ-
ees (or from 49% to 85% of employees).3
While the Government gained control of the Senate from 1 July 2005, a key prob-
lem remains. That problem is whether such a scheme would be valid under the 
Australian Constitution and the extent to which it could displace the State laws that 
already provide extensive regulation on workplace matters. This involves three 
distinct constitutional questions: 
1. could a single national law for the regulation of industrial relations be 
passed under a head of Commonwealth power; 
2. even if it could so be enacted, would the law nevertheless be struck down 
due to an express or implied constitutional limitation; and  
3. to what extent could the law override the State laws that already govern 
much of the field? 
II HEADS OF POWER 
The Federal Parliament can pass laws “with respect to” the 40 different areas listed 
in s 51 of the Constitution. These include matters ranging from taxation to marriage 
to quarantine, but do not include a general power over “workplace relations”. The 
closest that s 51 comes to such an area is s 51(xxxv), which grants legislative power 
over “Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State”.  
The conciliation and arbitration power has provided the basis over more than a 
century for federal laws on industrial relations: most notably, the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), the Industrial Relations Act 1988 
(Cth) and the current Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). Each of these Acts has 
necessarily been limited in its coverage in being drafted to conform to the parame-
ters of s 51(35). In particular, that power extends only to the techniques (“concilia-
tion and arbitration”) and only to the industrial disputes (“extending beyond the 
2 Workplace Relations Act, Part VIA, Division 3. See George Williams, The First Step to a National 
Industrial Relations Regime? Workplace Relations Amendment (Termination of Employment) Bill 2002, 
16 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF  LABOUR  LAW  94 (2003). 
3 EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS AMENDMENT (TERMINATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT) BILL (2002) at para 31. See also SENATE EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND 
EDUCATION COMMITTEE, PROVISIONS OF THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS AMENDMENT (TERMINATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT) BILL 2002 (2003). 
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limits of any one State”) to which it refers.4 It is clearly an insufficient basis for the 
type of national law that the Howard Government is proposing, which might, 
among other things, apply to all disputes, interstate and not, and involve the setting 
of minimum working conditions directly by legislation.5
In seeking to enact a national scheme that will move away from a focus on concilia-
tion and arbitration, the Government will need to rely primarily upon its other 
powers. These may include s 51(i) (“Trade and commerce with other countries, and 
among the States”) and s 51(xxix) (“External affairs”).6 In respect of Victoria, 
which in 1996 referred its power in the field to the Commonwealth,7 the Federal 
Parliament will also reply upon s 51(xxxvii) (“Matters referred to the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, but so 
that the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred, 
or which afterwards adopt the law”). Apart from Victoria, and with the possible 
exception of the trade and commerce power,8 the Commonwealth will need to rely 
on a further source of power to achieve its policy aims. It will thus turn to its power 
in s 51(xx) to make laws with respect to “Foreign corporations, and trading or 
financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth”.9
A Trade and Commerce Power 
The trade and commerce power is limited in its scope because of the High Court’s 
insistence that a distinction be maintained between intra and interstate trade and 
commerce, and that the power only be used to regulate the latter. Federal control of 
intrastate trade has been permitted where a physical nexus between it and interstate 
trade can be demonstrated,10 but not in other circumstances.11 The mere fact that 
intrastate commercial activity has economic consequences for interstate or 
international trade and commerce will not bring the former within the 
Commonwealth’s legislative power under s 51(i). The “artificial and unsuitable” 
nature of this distinction has been acknowledged and accepted because of a 
perception that it is an unavoidable consequence of “a distinction adopted by the 
4 See generally TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
THEORY: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS Ch 19 (3rd ed. 2002). The power also includes an implied 
incidental aspect: Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd, (1955) 93 CLR 55, 77 per Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ (“every legislative power carries with it authority to legislate in relation 
to acts, matters and things the control of which is found necessary to effectuate its main purpose, and 
thus carries with it power to make laws governing or affecting many matters that are incidental or 
ancillary to the subject-matter”). 
5 See Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v Whybrow & Co (No 2), (1910) 11 CLR 311, which 
held that the making of a “common rule” for a whole industry was not an exercise of the power of 
conciliation and arbitration. 
6 See generally on these powers GEORGE WILLIAMS, LABOUR LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION (1998). 
7 Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act, 1996 (Vic). 
8 See David McCann, First Head Revisited: A Single Industrial Relations System under the Trade and 
Commerce Power, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 75 (2004). 
9 See, on the use of the corporations power in this context, Andrew Stewart, Federal Labour Law and 
New Uses for the Corporations Power, 14 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 145 (2001). 
10 Airlines of NSW Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (Second Airlines Case), (1965) 113 CLR 54. 
11 Attorney-General (WA) v Australian National Airlines Commission, (1976) 138 CLR 492. 
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constitution [that] must be observed”.12 It should be noted, however, that this 
distinction is not express on the terms of s 51(i), and it may be argued that “the 
implied distinction between the two types of commerce should not obliterate what 
is, at its heart, an explicit affirmative grant of power”.13
It may be that the High Court’s approach to this power will change given that its 
last major consideration of the power was in 1976 in Attorney-General (WA) v 
Australian National Airlines Commission.14 Since that time, the Court has 
overhauled its approach to s 92, which also deals with interstate trade and 
commerce,15 and has given a relatively broad and generous construction to other 
powers like that over external affairs. As Leslie Zines has stated in regard to s 51(i): 
 
I find it difficult to believe that the modern court would uphold the dis-
tinctions drawn by the earlier judges. That is because of the logical diffi-
culties involved and the emphasis given in recent times to “practical 
reality” and the disapproval of formulas in a number of areas of constitu-
tional interpretation. Regard to such considerations would result in the 
overthrow of the distinction between physical effects and pure economic 
effects which some judges have used to preserve the distinctions between 
the forms of trade as much as possible.16
The “Commerce Clause” in Article I, s 8, cl 3 of the United States Constitution, was 
the inspiration for the trade and commerce provision in the Australian Constitution, 
and has been given a broad construction by United States Supreme Court. While 
this jurisprudence might provide a basis for a broader approach to the Australian 
provision, the High Court has not yet applied it.17 As Kitto J remarked in the Sec-
ond Airlines Case: 
The Australian union is one of dual federalism, and until the Parliament 
and the people see fit to change it, a true federation it must remain. This 
Court is entrusted with the preservation of constitutional distinctions, and 
it both fails in its task and exceeds its authority if it discards them, how-
ever out of touch with practical conceptions or with modern conditions 
they may appear to be in some or all of their applications. To import the 
doctrine of the American cases into the law of the Australian Constitution 
would in my opinion be an error. 18
On the other hand, if the trade and commerce power in the Australian Constitution 
12 Wragg v NSW, (1953) 88 CLR 353, 385-6. 
13 McCann, supra note 8, at 97.  
14 Compare Re Maritime Union of Australia; Ex Parte CSL Pacific Inc, (2003) 214 CLR 397. 
15 Cole v Whitfield, (1988) 165 CLR 360. 
16 Leslie Zines, Engineers and the“Federal Balance”, in HOW MANY CHEERS FOR ENGINEERS? 81, 86 
(Michael Coper & George Williams eds., 1997). 
17 See, for example, Airlines of NSW Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (Second Airlines Case), (1965) 
113 CLR 54, 113-115 per Kitto J. Compare Attorney-General (WA) v Australian National Airlines 
Commission, (1976) 138 CLR 492, 528-531 per Murphy J. 
18 Airlines of NSW Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (Second Airlines Case), (1965) 113 CLR 54, 115 
per Kitto J. 
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were interpreted to extend more generally to intrastate trading and commercial 
activities it would likely provide a basis upon which the Commonwealth could 
enact an Australia-wide industrial relations regime. In this context, industrial mat-
ters would likely be seen as an important part of the dealings of commerce that 
were the subject of the power. Indeed, the employment relationship might itself be 
characterised as a commercial transaction involving the sale of labour.  
B External Affairs Power 
The ‘external affairs’ power includes (though is not limited to) the power to give 
domestic effect to obligations imposed by treaties to which Australia is a party. The 
Industrial Relations Act Case19 is a striking example of the use of the external 
affairs power to implement industrial relations reform at the federal level. The 
terms of the legislation closely followed the requirements of the relevant interna-
tional instruments, and expressly stated that their object was the implementation of 
Australia’s obligations under those instruments. The range of matters dealt with by 
the amendments included the imposition of obligations on employers as to mini-
mum wages,20 equal pay,21 termination of employment,22 discrimination in em-
ployment23 and parental leave,24 and also provided for collective bargaining and a 
limited right to strike.25 In upholding almost every aspect of the legislation that was 
based upon the external affairs power, the case demonstrated the considerable 
potential of the power to enable Commonwealth legislative action regarding indus-
trial relations. However, the power can only be used to the extent that a government 
is willing to implement policies that are consistent with International Labour Or-
ganization and other international conventions. Such a fit is not always possible, 
and indeed unlikely to be the case in regard to the proposal put forward by the 
Howard Government, which have more of an emphasis upon individual contracts 
than collective bargaining. Indeed, as one commentator has remarked, the Howard 
Government possesses a “marked antipathy towards the ILO, and to standards 
emanating from that body”.26
In order to be held valid by the High Court under the external affairs power, a law 
19 Victoria v Commonwealth, (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
20 These provisions were in accordance with the ILO MINIMUM WAGE FIXING CONVENTION 1970. 
21 These provisions were intended to implement a range of Conventions, such as the CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, and the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. 
22 These provisions were intended to give effect to the TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONVENTION, 
the DISCRIMINATION (EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION) CONVENTION, and the FAMILY 
RESPONSIBILITIES CONVENTION. 
23 These provisions were intended to give effect to the DISCRIMINATION (EMPLOYMENT AND 
OCCUPATION) CONVENTION. 
24 These provisions were intended to give effect to the Family Responsibilities Convention and associ-
ated ILO Recommendations. 
25 These provisions had the object of implementing Australia’s international obligations to provide for a 
right to strike, arising under various international instruments including the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT 
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. 
26 Breen Creighton, The Workplace Relations Act in International Perspective, 10 AUSTRALIAN 
JOURNAL OF  LABOUR  LAW 31, 32 (1997). 
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must be “reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to im-
plementing the treaty”.27 Problems arise, for example, if the legislation exceeds 
what is reasonably required to satisfy Australia’s obligations under the Conven-
tion;28 perhaps if the legislation does not comply with all the obligations of the 
treaty29 or if the treaty expresses some vague goal or ideal rather than prescribing a 
more specific course of action to be taken by signatory states.30  
C Corporations Power 
It appears that the current limited scope of the trade and commerce power and the 
lack of fit between the relevant international conventions and the Howard Govern-
ment's policy proposals will mean that the Commonwealth instead relies primarily 
upon its power over corporations. A potential problem, however, is that the extent 
of this power is unclear. There are two important limitations on its power. 
First, it is addressed only to corporations, and even then it is addressed only to 
certain types of corporations (that is, foreign, trading and financial corporations). 
High Court decisions mean that a corporation will fall within the power in most 
cases so long as it has substantial trading activities.31 This will mean that almost all 
corporations will fall within the scope of the power. On the other hand, some corpo-
rations will not, such as corporations like charitable bodies that lack substantial 
trading activities. More importantly, the power does not encompass non-corporate 
entitles like partnerships, sole traders and unincorporated associations. Where such 
bodies operate a business within the limits of one State they may also escape regu-
lation enacted under the interstate trade and commerce power in s 51(i). This will 
frustrate the attempt to enact a single national scheme covering all instances of 
employment. 
Second, there is an unresolved division of opinion in the High Court as to which 
activities of the corporations in s 51(xx) can be regulated. It is sometimes said that 
two possible views, a narrow and a broad view, border the possible scope of the 
power: 
27 This requirement was expounded in Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 
CLR 1 and was endorsed in Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case), (1996) 187 CLR 
416, 487 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ.  
28 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 236-7 per Brennan J, 267 per 
Deane J. 
29 Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case), (1996) 187 CLR 416, 488: “It would be a 
tenable proposition that legislation purporting to implement a treaty does not operate upon the subject 
which is an aspect of external affairs unless the legislation complies with all the obligations assumed 
under the treaty.” 
30  Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case), (1996) 187 CLR 416, 487 per Brennan CJ, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 
31 R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League, (1979) 143 CLR 190; State 
Superannuation Board of Victoria v Trade Practices Commission, (1982) 150 CLR 282. 
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• Narrow View:32 The clue is in the categories of corporations specified 
as being within power: “foreign corporations”, and Australian-based 
“trading” or “financial” corporations. Thus the aspects or activities 
that the Commonwealth can regulate must have something to do with 
the characteristic that brings corporations within Commonwealth 
power. This would mean, for example, that only the trading activities 
of a trading corporation could be regulated and not any of the other 
activities of the corporation (such as the relationship between the 
corporation and its employees where this lies outside of its trading 
activities).  
• Broad View:33 There are no limits at all. Provided that a corporation 
has the characteristics that bring it within s 51(xx), any aspect or 
activity of that corporation can be regulated by the Commonwealth 
(including the relationship of a constitutional corporation with its 
employees). 
A majority of the High Court has moved beyond the narrow view but has yet to 
accept the broad view of the power. In the Tasmanian Dam Case,34 the Court held 
that s 51(xx) at least enables the Commonwealth to regulate the activities of trading 
corporations undertaken for the purposes of the trading activities of that 
corporation. Under this approach, it is likely that the Commonwealth can regulate 
some aspects of employment within a constitutional corporation (the degree is 
unclear) on the basis that such employment is for the purpose of the trading 
activities of the corporation. While the reasoning might enable the regulation of all 
actions of all of the employees of a constitutional corporation (each employee being 
taken on for the purpose of the trading activities of the corporation), the High Court 
has yet to hold this. Whether it ultimately does so will depend on the precise 
drafting (perhaps just a few key words in the statute) and application in practice of 
any new law. 
A 1995 High Court decision on the power, Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner,35 which 
dealt with a law in the industrial relations context, also fell short of the broad view. 
A 1992 amendment to the Industrial Relations Act 1988, (Cth) gave the Industrial 
Relations Commission the power to examine unfair contracts imposed on independ-
ent contractors. Such contracts could be set aside wholly or in part or varied under 
s 127b. By s 127A(1)(a)(ii), the power extended only to contracts for services 
32 For example, Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd, (1982) 150 CLR 
169, 182 per Gibbs CJ (“The words of par (xx) suggest that the nature of the corporation to which the 
laws relate must be significant as an element in the nature or character of the laws, if they are to be valid 
. . . In other words, in the case of trading and financial corporations, laws which relate to their trading 
and financial activities will be within the power.”). 
33 For example, Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1, 149 per Mason 
J (“There is nothing in the context of s 51(xx) which compels the conclusion that the language in which 
the power is expressed should be given a restricted interpretation . . . [W]e should recognize that the 
power confers a plenary power with respect to the categories of corporation”.). 
34 Commonwealth v Tasmania, (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
35 (1995) 183 CLR 323. 
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relating “to the performance of work by the independent contractor, other than work 
for the private and domestic purposes of the other party to the contract”. By 
s 127C(1), the power extended to cases: “(a) in relation to a contract to which a 
constitutional corporation is a party; (b) in relation to a contract relating to the 
business of a constitutional corporation; (c) in relation to a contract entered into by 
a constitutional corporation for the purposes of the business of the corporation”. By 
s 127C(2), “constitutional corporation” was defined by reference to s 51(xx) of the 
Constitution. 
The relevant corporation, Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd, was not itself a 
party to the relevant contract. Timber for the company’s woodchip mill was har-
vested and transported to the mill by independent contractors, including Mr and 
Mrs Wagner. They, in turn, had entered into sub-contracts with Mr and Mrs Ding-
jan and Mr and Mrs Ryan. The sub-contractors sought review and variation of their 
contract under s 127A. Since the company was not a party to the contract, 
s 127C(1)(a) and (c) were not applicable. The only basis on which the Act could 
apply was s 127C(1)(b). 
By 4:3, the Court found that s 127C(1)(b) could not be supported under s 51(xx). 
The lowest common position on the scope of s 51(xx) was that of McHugh J and (in 
dissent) Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ that “the power conferred by s 51(xx) 
extends, at the very least, to the business functions and activities of constitutional 
corporations and to their business relationships”.36 Otherwise, the Court adopted a 
different approach to the characterisation of a law under the corporations power. It 
determined whether the law was valid based upon whether it possessed a sufficient 
degree of relevance or connection to the corporations listed in the power. In this 
case, in the words of McHugh J as part of the majority, such a connection was 
lacking: 
 It does not follow … that s 51(xx) authorises any law that operates on con-
duct that relates to the activities, functions, relationships or business of 
trading, financial or foreign corporations. The law must be a law ‘with re-
spect to’ a corporation of the kind described by s 51(xx). That means that 
the law must have ‘a relevance to or connection with’ a s 51(xx) corpora-
tion. It is not enough, however, that the law ‘should refer to the subject 
matter or apply to the subject matter’ … 
Where a law purports to be ‘with respect to’ a s 51(xx) corporation, it is 
difficult to see how it can have any connection with such a corporation 
unless, in its legal or practical operation, it has significance for the corpo-
ration. That means that it must have some significance for the activities, 
functions, relationships or business of the corporation. If a law regulates 
the activities, functions, relationships or business of a s 51(xx) corporation, 
no more is needed to bring the law within s 51(xx). That is because the 
law, by regulating the activities, etc, is regulating the conduct of the corpo-
36 Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 365 per Gaudron J. 
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ration or those who deal with it. Further, if, by reference to the activities or 
functions of s 51(xx) corporations, a law regulates the conduct of those 
who control, work for, or hold shares or office in those corporations, it is 
unlikely that any further fact will be needed to bring the law within the 
reach of s 51(xx). 
It is not enough, however, to attract the operation of s 51(xx) that the law 
merely refers to or operates upon the existence of a corporate function or 
relationship or a category of corporate behaviour.37
This approach suggests that an industrial relations law that operates upon the corpo-
rations listed in s 51(xx) in a way that is significant to them will be valid under the 
power. As McHugh J stated: “if, by reference to the activities or functions of 
s 51(xx) corporations, a law regulates the conduct of those who … work for … 
those corporations, it is unlikely that any further fact will be needed to bring the law 
within the reach of s 51(xx)”. On the other had, to the extent that the law regulated 
employee entitlements or industrial matters that had little or no significance for the 
employing corporation the law would be invalid, as was the case with the law at 
issue in Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner. 
The scope of s 51(xx) was again raised in the High Court in 1996 in the Industrial 
Relations Act Case,38 a challenge to changes brought about to the Industrial Rela-
tions Act, 1988, (Cth) by the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) and the 
Industrial Relations Amendment Act (No 2) 1994 (Cth). Although three States 
instituted proceedings to challenge the validity of the new legislation, only Western 
Australia challenged those provisions that primarily relied on s 51(xx), and at the 
hearing that challenge was abandoned. As was stated in that case: “Subject to one 
possible exception [as to secondary boycotts], it was conceded in argument by 
Western Australia . . . that the Parliament has power to legislate as to the industrial 
rights and obligations of constitutional corporations . . . and their employees”.39 
Accordingly, the validity of such legislation was “not in issue”.40
Uncertainty about the scope of the corporations power means that it cannot be said 
with confidence that a law that sought to regulate the full range of industrial matters 
that can arise between employers and employees in a s 51(xx) corporation would be 
a valid enactment under the power. This uncertainty is magnified by the fact that 
the issue will be determined by a High Court composed entirely of judges who did 
37 (1995) 183 CLR 323, 368-369. 
38 Victoria v Commonwealth, (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
39 Victoria v Commonwealth, (1996) 187 CLR 416, 539. 
40 Victoria v Commonwealth, (1996) 187 CLR 416, 540. The only significant context in which the Court 
found it necessary to enter upon detailed discussion of s 51(xx) was that of “secondary boycotts”. The 
original provisions upheld in Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd, 
(1982) 150 CLR 169 had substantially been re-enacted, but with additional protections for trade unions. 
In holding both the “boycott” provisions and the ancillary protections for trade unions valid, the Court 
simply applied Actors Equity.  
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not sit on the last major decision on the power, Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner.41 
Moreover, most of the current members of the Court have not even delivered judg-
ments on like powers in s 51 so as to enable an assessment of their likely approach 
to s 51(xx). The scope of the power thus remains very much open.  
III CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
The powers of the Federal Parliament are subject to a number of express and im-
plied limitations arising from the Constitution. The express limitations include s 
116, which provides for freedom of religion,42 and s 92, which states that “trade, 
commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage 
or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free”. Neither of these provisions, nor any 
of the other express restrictions in the Constitution, are likely to stand in the way of 
the Commonwealth enacting a new federal industrial relations law. 
On the other hand, the implied immunity of the States from certain Commonwealth 
laws will have an important impact. That immunity will strike down a federal law 
that imposes a “special burden” on the States so as to curtail their capacity “to 
function as governments”.43 This limitation was applied in the context of federal 
industrial laws in Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria.44 The High 
Court held that a Commonwealth law could not regulate the capacity of State gov-
ernments to:  
determine the number and identity of the persons whom it [the State] 
wishes to employ, the term of employment of such persons and, as well as, 
the number and identity of the persons whom it wishes to dismiss with or 
without notice from its employment on redundancy grounds. An impair-
ment of a State’s rights in these respects would, in our view, constitute an 
infringement of the implied limitation.45
In addition, the limitation struck down Commonwealth regulation of the terms and 
conditions of employment of those engaged in higher levels of government, includ-
ing “minimum wages and working conditions”.46 This finding has since been ap-
plied in the Industrial Relations Act Case,47 where the Court found that the 
“minimum wage” provisions introduced into the Industrial Relations Act breached 
the immunity insofar as they affected employees at the higher levels of State gov-
41 McHugh J retires on 30 October 2005. Justice Susan Crennan from Victoria will take up the empty 
position on the Court.  
42 Section 116 provides: “The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or 
for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no 
religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth”. 
43 Austin v Commonwealth, (2003) 215 CLR 185, 249 per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ applying 
Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth, (1947) 74 CLR 31. 
44 (1995) 184 CLR 188. See also CFMEU v Newcrest Mining Ltd, [2005] NSWIRComm 23. 
45  Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria, (1995) 184 CLR 188, 232. 
46  Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria, (1995) 184 CLR 188, 233. 
47 Victoria v Commonwealth, (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
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ernment.48
If a new law were not drafted to take account of this gap in federal power, it would 
not likely mean that the whole law was invalid. Instead, the Court would “read 
down” the law to its remaining valid operation in accordance with s 15A of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).49
IV OVERRIDING STATE LAWS 
Section 109 of the Constitution provides: “When a law of a State is inconsistent 
with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to 
the extent of any inconsistency, be invalid”.50 The High Court had held that where a 
State law is overridden due to s 109 it is not “invalid” in the sense that the State 
Parliament lacked the power to pass it. Instead, the State law, though enacted with 
full validity, merely ceases to operate.51 This means that, if the federal law giving 
rise to the inconsistency is repealed, the State law resumes its normal legislative 
effect. 
As federal legislation and awards have entered into the field of industrial relations, s 
109 has meant that they have steadily rendered inoperative the State legislation and 
awards that had occupied the field. This is in part due to the willingness of the High 
Court to find an inconsistency between State and federal laws. Inconsistency can be 
shown not only by the fact that the two laws provide contrary directions, but merely 
by the fact that the federal law “covers the field”. In such a case, there need not be 
any contradiction between the two enactments. It may even happen that both re-
quire the same conduct, or pursue the same legislative purpose. What is imputed to 
the Commonwealth Parliament is a legislative intention that its law shall be all the 
law there is on that topic. In that event, what is “inconsistent” with the Common-
wealth law is the existence of any State law at all on that topic. This test makes 
s 109 a much more powerful instrument for ensuring the supremacy of Common-
wealth law. 
The High Court has further held that inconsistency can be ‘manufactured’ by ex-
press words in a federal statute. In Botany Municipal Council v Federal Airports 
48 See also CFMEU v Newcrest Mining Limited, [2005] NSWIRComm 23. 
49 Section 15A states: “Every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution, and so as not to 
exceed the legislative power of the Commonwealth, to the intent that where any enactment thereof 
would, but for this section, have been construed as being in excess of that power, it shall nevertheless be 
a valid enactment to the extent to which it is not in excess of that power.” 
50 In the case of Australian Capital Territory legislation the effect of s 109 is replicated by s 28 of the 
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act, 1988, (Cth). Northern Territory legislation also falls 
away in the face of conflicting Commonwealth legislation, even though the Northern Territory (Self-
Government) Act, 1978, (Cth) is silent on the issue. See, for example, Federal Capital Commission v 
Laristan Building and Investment Co Pty Ltd, (1929) 42 CLR 582, 588 per Dixon J; Webster v 
McIntosh, (1980) 32 ALR 603, 605-606 per Brennan J; R v Kearney; Ex parte Japanangka, (1984) 158 
CLR 395, 417-419 per Brennan J; Attorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, (1989) 90 
ALR 59, 75 per Lockhart J. 
51 Carter v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic), (1942) 66 CLR 557, 573 per Latham CJ. 
509   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 2 
 
                                                          
Corporation52 the High Court unanimously held that the Commonwealth could, by 
regulation, expressly render inoperative several recited New South Wales laws that 
impacted upon the building of a third runway at Sydney Airport. In a unanimous 
judgment, the Court stated: “There can be no objection to a Commonwealth law on 
a subject which falls within a head of Commonwealth legislative power providing 
that a person is authorized to undertake an activity despite a State law prohibiting, 
restricting, qualifying or regulating that activity.”53
In light of this unanimous decision,54 it is clear that a Commonwealth industrial 
relations law could be expressed to directly override State laws in the same area. 
However, State laws would still only be affected “to the extent of the inconsis-
tency”. Thus, State laws would remain in operation to the extent that they dealt with 
matters outside of the scope of federal power. The extent to which State laws on 
industrial relations may still operate after any new federal law will also depend 
upon the terms of that federal law and the extent to which it leaves any room for 
those State laws (such as if a decision were made that the new federal law could not 
override certain existing State employee entitlements).55 Nevertheless, whatever 
doubt there is about the scope of Commonwealth power to enact a national indus-
trial relations scheme, it is clear that a validly enacted law can override State indus-
trial laws. 
V CONCLUSION 
The Commonwealth lacks a head of power that will provide a clear basis for the 
enactment of a single national scheme for the regulation of industrial relations in 
Australia. While existing heads of power, especially those over certain corporations 
and interstate trade and commerce, might be used to greatly expand the coverage of 
federal law on the subject, they are likely to be insufficient to enact a comprehen-
sive national industrial relations scheme. 
The key unresolved question is the scope of the federal Parliament’s corporations 
power and how it will be interpreted by the High Court. At the very least, the corpo-
rations power, even in combination with that over interstate trade and commerce, 
will not be able to extend to industrial matters arising out of some businesses, such 
as partnerships, that trade within the confines of one State. Of course, if the federal 
law were carefully drafted to fall within the narrowest accepted scope of its power, 
it would likely be valid. However, if the law were drafted in this way it would not 
extend to many of the matters that would be expected to fall within a comprehen-
sive national law on the subject.  
It is clear, however, that, even if the High Court gives the relevant heads of Com-
52 (1992) 175 CLR 453. 
53 Botany Municipal Council v Federal Airports Corporation, (1992) 175 CLR 453, 465. 
54 See also Bayside City Council v Telstra Corporation Ltd, (2004) 216 CLR 595.
55 See George Williams, The Return of State Awards – Section 109 of the Constitution and the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth), 10 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW, 170 (1997). 
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monwealth power a generous construction, a new federal law cannot regulate some 
of the industrial conditions of State public servants, especially at the higher levels 
of government. On the other hand, where the federal law is valid, it will be capable 
of displacing any current State laws in the same field. 
The interaction of the Constitution and industrial law in Australia goes back to the 
very early days of Federation. Indeed, explorations of their power over the field by 
State and federal governments have provided many of the most important constitu-
tional decisions in the history of the High Court. These decisions can often involve 
turning points in constitutional doctrine and federal relationships,56 and demon-
strate how difficult such matters can be to predict the outcome.  
A salutary example from a related area is the attempt by the Commonwealth to 
enact a single national corporations law, the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), under its 
corporations power. At the time, it was widely believed that the law would be held 
valid by the High Court, and the Commonwealth passed the Act without support 
from the States, such as in the form of a co-operative scheme or a referral of power. 
In 1990, the issue was resolved in a way that reasserted limits on Commonwealth 
power. In the Incorporation Case,57 the High Court held by 6 to 1 that the corpora-
tions power does not enable the Commonwealth to regulate the incorporation of 
companies. The decision meant that the Commonwealth could not, by itself, estab-
lish a national corporations regime, but could only do so in co-operation with the 
States. Today, such co-operation provides the foundation for Australia’s national 
corporations law. In the field of industrial relations, this may ultimately provide a 
better model for achieving a single national law. 
 
56 The classic example is the decision of the High Court in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v 
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (Engineers’ Case), (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
57 New South Wales v Commonwealth, (1990) 169 CLR 482. 
